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Abstract 





In context of the Canadian markets, the aim of this study was to establish a relationship 
between corporate governance and cash holdings and Using governance metrics based on 
Globe and Mail Corporate governance data, we find that governance has a substantial 
negative impact on the cash holdings of the firms. When segregated on the basis of size, 
smaller size firms have shown consistent results when compared with the overall market 
result. On the other hand, no conclusive evidence could be established for bigger size 
firms. Our results are consistent with the assumption that investors in companies with 
poor shareholder protection cannot force managers to disgorge excessive cash balances. 
This research provides a platform for future research in context of the Canadian markets 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background of Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance, a topic of immense importance refers to the guidelines that control 
and direct a corporation.  Generally people associate corporate governance as a matter 
regulated by legislation, a more famous example being the Sarbanes- Oxley Act in 
context of the US firms and Ontario’s Securities Act (OSA) for Canadian firms. 
Macdonald (2010) further broadened the scope of corporate governance in his article 
“Why You Should Care About Corporate Governance” published in Globe and Mail on 
December 3, 2010. As per him, governance is beyond regulations, a matter of ethics to 
make sure that action of employees, especially the senior management is not driven by 
personal greed or nepotism. Klazema (2014) further exemplified the importance of a 
good governance system from a business perspective. By good governance he referred to 
disclosure and transparency of business information that leads to higher level of trust 
amongst general public and minimizes fraud.  
1.2 Importance of Corporate Governance 
 
What makes the study of corporate governance so importance is that fact that there has 
been evidence from multiple resources of market participants putting a higher value to 
the stocks of a well-governed company. Global Investor Opinion Survey by McKinsey & 
Company (2002) indicates that significant numbers of institutional investors are willing 
to pay premium for the stock price of a company with a good corporate governance 
system in place, with premiums varying from 12-14% in North America and Western 
Europe, 20-25% in Asia and Latin America and over 30% in Africa and Eastern Europe. 
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The survey further cites the fact that 60 percent of investors around the globe consider 
governance quality before investing in a company. Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD (2004)) in its “Principles of Corporate Governance” 
publication, mentions the fact that lower cost of capital and efficient use of resources can 
be achieved with an effective corporate governance system in place. Johnson et al (2000) 
in their study of Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 also provided evidence that suggested, 
measures of corporate governance especially the adequate provisions for protection of 
minority shareholders provide an explanation to exchange rate depreciation and stock 
market decline. Financial scandals around the world, the most famous being Enron and 
WorldCom in North America and Parmalat in Europe, have further augmented the need 
for a better control mechanism for managers which had also been favored in earlier 
research by Berle and Means (1968).  
1.3 Importance of Cash Holdings 
 
Before we investigate the relationship between corporate governance and cash holding, 
we first need to understand the importance of cash holdings and why do firms hold cash? 
Stulz et al. (2009) cited four main reasons why firms find it attractive to hold cash. The 
first reason is precautionary motive wherein firms hold cash in order to avoid any shocks 
due to adverse market conditions, when borrowing is costly. The second reason is 
transaction motive. Third reason for holding cash is for repatriating taxes. Firms are 
motivated to keep their earnings from their foreign subsidiaries abroad only in form of 
cash to avoid taxes. The fourth reason, which is crucial from point of view of our 
research is, the agency motive. During periods when no profitable investment 
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opportunities are available, entrenched managers would prefer to hold cash rather than 
distributing among shareholders, as argued by Jensen (1986).  
 
Another possible reason for holding cash is related to research and development (R&D) 
activities of an organization. The growing importance of R&D can be attributed to the 
growing nature of economies around the world. The inherent nature of R&D is 
uncertainty and this very fact led to a natural relationship between cash holdings and 
R&D activities of an organization. Stulz et al. (2009), cited evidence from US suggesting 
that firms have changed over a period time as they are holding less inventories and 
receivables, and are becoming more R&D intensive which in turn gives them additional 
motive to hold cash. In his research, precautionary motive has been documented a reason 
for increase in the cash ratio whereas no plausible evidence has been found suggesting 
agency problems’ contribution towards increase in the cash holdings. 
1.4 Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings 
 
No discussion on corporate governance is complete without addressing the relationship 
between shareholders and managers that is characterized by conflicts. Agency costs that 
arise because of these conflicts between the two self-interested parties, consists of 
monitoring the behavior of managers. Cash holding available to firms is a centrifugal 
force in this relationship between shareholders and managers as Jensen (1986) in his free 
cash flow hypothesis asserted that entrenched managers are hesitant to distribute excess 
cash to shareholders. The central tradeoff in free cash flow hypothesis developed by 
Jensen (1986) and research on management’s control on financial policies by Stulz 
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(1990) is to provide sufficient capital to mangers to invest in projects with positive NPV 
and limit the availability of capital for projects with low cash inflow. However, without a 
proper governance mechanism in place, it is not possible to avoid self-interested 
managers to invest in low return projects at the expense of distributing cash reserves to 
shareholders.  This further signifies the importance of governance in controlling the 
disgorgement of cash reserves by managers and gives us a reason to study how corporate 
governance affect the tendency of cash reserves.  
 
Cross country studies by Dittmar et al (2003) and Lins and Kalcheva (2004) provide 
evidence suggesting that stronger shareholder rights are linked to lower cash holdings or 
in other words, weak corporate governance measures increase cash holdings.   
 
In context of the US markets, there has been a mix viewpoint on governance and its role 
in cash reserves. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) suggest that cash holding is not a cause of 
conflict between shareholders and managers. On the other side, Harford (1999) provides 
evidence to validate the fact that shareholders are right in showing concerns regarding 
cash reserves at disposal to manager’s discretion. A substantial research by Harford et al 
(2008) specifically in context of the US markets provided evidence that firms with weak 
governance structure have lower cash reserves and excess cash in an environment of 
weak shareholder rights escalates acquisition activities and capital expenditures. They 
further added that companies with weak shareholder rights with excess cash reserves 
have low valuations and profitability.  
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There has been ample evidence advocating the tendency of managers to engage in low 
return investments at the cost of investors. This coupled with frequent corporate collapses 
and lawsuits have necessitated an efficient monitoring system for the organization and 
have become a matter of global concern.  Bars have been raised to improve the standards 
of present corporate governance systems with underlying assumption that a good 
governance system in place leads to higher returns of stakeholders. Felton et al (1996) 
and Hawkins (1997) defined good governance as the one in which outsiders are a 
majority in a company board, along with having independent directors who have no ties 
with the management and who hold significant amount of the shares of the company. 
Additionally board members are answerable to investor requests and their remuneration 
is in a large extent by company stocks.  
 
Now the actual question arises, how do we formally define the concept of corporate 
governance? The answer lies in the various researches conducted during previous years. 
The most notable of them is by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), wherein they define 
corporate governance as a measure through which investors, themselves ensure returns on 
their investments. Their definition provided a more broader spectrum to the concept of 
corporate governance by including the ideology of agency theory and principal agent 
relationship which was previously formulated by Jensen and Meckling (1986) wherein 
they defined agency theory as a study of relationship between managers and stakeholders 
which has been marred due to conflicting interests. A similar viewpoint by Picou and 
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Rubach (2006) define corporate governance as the establishment of rules and regulations 
to align effectively the interests of the agents (boards and managers) with those of the 
principals (investors).  
2.1 Measures of Corporate Governance  
 
Beyond the bounds of the above-mentioned definitions, still no consensus has been 
reached on what constitutes a good corporate governance system or what are its elements. 
Major studies on corporate governance have tried to address this particular issue of a 
good governance system in isolation i.e.  Hermalin andWeisbach (1991), Barnhart et al 
(1994), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Bhagat and Black (2002), Bozec (2005), and 
Krivogorsky (2006). But the partial approach of these studies has failed to develop a 
decisive model for corporate governance.   
2.2 Governance Measures in Context of US Market 
 
Recent study done by Gompers et al (2003) used various governance measures to assess 
shareholder rights. In this model they used twenty-four corporate governance provisions 
for a sample of about 1500 firms per year and from this sample they build a Governance 
Index (G Index) to serve as a proxy for shareholder rights.  
 
A modified version of the G Index (Gompers et al (2003)) was developed by Bebchuk et 
al (2005) and is known as the Entrenchment Index or E Index. E Index is based on six 
provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, 
golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. 
The rationale behind not including the other 18 IRRC (Investor Responsibility Research 
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Center) provisions present in Gompers et al (2003) governance index was because of 
their positive correlation with firm valuation. The purpose of E Index was to develop a 
governance measure that is not affected by noise produced by other IRRC provisions. 
Although the main purpose of these studies mentioned above was to establish a positive 
correlation between corporate governance and firm performance but an additional sub- 
component of end result of these studies was a corporate governance index. Some private 
organizations also developed corporate governance rating systems in the US, for 
example, Standard & Poor’s S&P Corporate Governance Scores and Governance Metrics 
International (GMI).  
 
It is argued that indices like G Index, S&P or GMI corporate governance scores are better 
measure of corporate governance as opposed to stand-alone proxies as the former include 
all the elements that constitute a good corporate governance system.  
2.3 Governance Measures for Other Countries 
 
A similar approach had been developed by Bauer et al (2004) who constructed good 
governance portfolios and bad governance portfolios using the Deminor corporate 
governance ratings (started in 1995 and currently part of RiskMetrics (MSCI group)) for 
companies that are part of FTSE Eurotop 300 index. Evidence of research on similar lines 
have been found from around the world, amongst which the notable ones are Drobetz et 
al (2003) corporate governance index, based on 30 governance proxies for German public 
firms and Von Nandelstadth and Rosenberg (2003) index of corporate governance for the 
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firms trading on Helsinki Stock Exchange and finally Black et al (2003) corporate 
governance index for 525 companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange.  
2.4 Governance Measure for Canadian Firms 
 
In Canada corporate governance score is developed by Globe and Mail (a Canadian 
newspaper), for companies trading on Toronto Stock Exchange and is part of S&P/ TSX 
index. This score takes into account shareholder rights, disclosure issues, board 
composition, manager shareholdings and compensation. The data for this was obtained 
from the published proxy information circular for shareholders. The results are 
summarized in an aggregate corporate governance index (CGI), which is computed as the 
sum of these four sub-indices.  
2.5 Previous Research in Corporate Governance 
 
Cross border perspective 
Dittmar et al  (2003) from a cross-country perspective (data for more than 11000 samples 
firms from 45 countries was collected from Global Vantage Database for 1998, including 
471 firms from Canada with US, UK and Japan representing the largest share in the 
sample) suggest that organizations in countries with weak governance tend to hold nearly 
twice as cash as organization in countries with stronger shareholder rights. They further 
elaborated on the fact that investors in countries with weak shareholder rights cannot 
force managers to forfeit excessive cash. Pinkowitz et al (2004) further documented that 
firms in countries with weak shareholder rights are less likely to be operated for the 
benefits of shareholders because the weak shareholder rights makes it easier for 
management and controlling shareholders to appropriate corporate resources for their 
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own benefit. Cross-country studies give evidence that suggest stronger shareholder rights 
are associated with lower cash holdings. This signifies the fact that shareholders’ with 
authority want managers to forfeit cash to shareholders. Lins and Kalcheva (2004) in 
their cross border study involving 5000 firms from 31 countries testified that in an 
environment of weak external shareholder protection, firm values are lower when 
controlling managers hold more cash and firm values are higher when controlling 
managers pay dividends. 
 
In context of US market 
In the context of the US market, the previous studies have provided a mixed opinion on 
cash reserves. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith (2007) found that dollar value of cash is 
significantly less if a firm has poor corporate governance. They further documented that a 
well governed firm has its excess cash reserves better utilized whereas firms with weak 
corporate governance exhaust excess cash reserves more rapidly on less profitable 
investments than those with stronger corporate governance. In short, firms which are 
poorly governed deplete excess cash resources and damage the value of firm. Harford 
(1999) in his study ascertained that acquisition by excess cash reserves is value 
decreasing for firms in most of the cases which is consisted with the free cash flow 
hypothesis (Jensen (1986)).  
 
In contrary, works of Mikkelson and Partch (2003) suggest that large cash reserves held 
by a company continuously over a period of time do not lead to poor operating 
performance. Opler et al (1999) in their study of publically traded US firms over a period 
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of 1971 till 1994 documented a very strong precautionary motive behind managers 
holding excess cash reserves. However their study provide limited evidence to prove the 
fact that positive excess cash can lead firms to spend more on investment or acquisitions. 
Fresard and Silva (2010) in their study of excess cash and corporate governance in 
context of US cross listing have found substantial evidence in favor of foreign firms 
listed on US exchanges. The value investors attach to excess cash reserves is higher for 
them when compared to domestic firms in the US market.  
 
Motivation for my research comes from fact that no prior research has been done to study 
relationship between corporate governance and cash holdings in context of the Canadian 
market. Serving as a reference for my research, I follow the methodology deployed by 
Harford (2008) and I further extend their study to the Canadian companies that are dual 
listed in TSX and S&P simultaneously. Harford et al (2008) studied relationship between 
corporate governance and cash holding in context to the US firms and provided a 
valuable insight into the distribution of cash based on the strength of the governance 
structure. They further observed that firms with excess cash reserves along with weak 
shareholder rights tend to have lower profitability and valuation. A positive correlation 




Chapter 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data Description 
 
Measuring corporate governance  
For the purpose of our research, we used Globe and Mail (G&M) annual corporate 
governance ratings developed by McFarland (2002) to measure the quality of corporate 
governance for Canadian firms. This is public information, which is available freely 
through Globe and Mail newspaper or the internet. Report on Business of the Globe and 
Mail newspaper in collaboration with the Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics and Board 
Effectiveness (CCBE) at Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 
assessed the corporate governance practices on the basis of the proxy information 
circulars published by Canadian firms. McFarland (2002) cited that marking system used 
was based on recommendations from professional associations like CCBE, institutional 
investors and academicians.  The annual G&M report includes companies listed in the 
S&P/TSX index for that particular year.  
 
A discrepancy in the data in terms of companies not present every year in G&M ratings is 
because they were not included in S&P/TSX index for that particular year. An alternate 
explanation by McFarland (2002) mentions the fact that several companies in the index 
on Sept. 1, 2002 (the initial year of G&M ratings) were excluded because they had 
merged recently and hence do not have new proxy circulars available. All information in 




Considered as a valued reliable source of valuable governance information in context of 
the Canadian markets, recent researches in similar domains have relied on the G&M 
annual ratings to evaluate the association between corporate governance and performance 
of Canadian firms ((Klein (2005) and Adjaoud (2007)) or study on quality of earnings by 
Niu (2006). Bozec and Bozec (2007) used G&M governance scores to analyze 
relationship between ownership structure and quality of corporate governance practices in 
Canada. 
 
The Globe and Mail corporate governance ranking is calculated on a 100-point scale 
constituting four components. The aggregate score is obtained by summing the ratings 
obtained in these four components, which are board composition, shareholdings and 
compensation issues, shareholder rights issues and disclosure issues (further details about 
these four components are mentioned in Appendix A on page 39). According to G &M, 
firms with superior governance practices should achieve higher scores. Company with 
maximum points is ranked highest, which signifies that this firm has a highly independent 
board along with stringent requirements for share ownership by directors and their CEOs. 
Additionally, top ranked firms manifest equality in terms of treatment of shareholders in 
voting rights. These companies honestly provide full disclosure of key information, such 
as payment to auditors and the relation of directors to the company.  
 
Control variables  
For the purpose of our study we utilized Compustat Fundamental database to collect data 
for the various control variables used in our research. Keeping in sync with the G&M 
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governance score that initiated in the year 2002, the annual data from Compustat 
Fundamental dataset ranges from 2002 till 2013. 
 
A code was written in python to combine data files from two sources. The first file 
contained G&M governance ranking for one particular year and the second file was a 
master data file from the Compustat Fundamental database which contained the control 
variables ranging from 2002 till 2013 for companies listed on both S&P and TSX index.  
The purpose of the code was to combine the two datasets in a manner such that the 
companies included in the final output file should be present in both the data files. The 
code is written for every year and the end result is a combined in a final output file that 
contains both the governance data and financial data for companies for years ranging 
from 2002 till 2013.  
 
SIC codes were used to eliminate companies with SIC code between 4900 and 4999 and 
between 6000 and 6999 as companies with SIC code within this range are classified as 
utilities and financial companies respectively. Their purpose of holding cash is for 
operational purposes and hence including these companies would have distorted our end 
result.  
 
Following are the control variables used in our research: 
Firm size: measured as a natural log of total assets of a company for a particular year. 
Cash Holdings: log (Cash / Sales). For our research we consider liquid cash a necessary 
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requirement to support the working capital needs of the firm, which in turn depends on 
the sales. 
Sales: This item represents gross sales (the amount of actual billings to customers for 
regular sales completed during the period) 
Total assets: total amount of assets held by the company 
R&D/ Sales: ratio of R&D to sales is used as a proxy measure for financial distress cost. 
R&D and Sales data for this purpose has been obtained from Compustat fundamental 
dataset. 
Current Assets/ Total Assets: ratio of current assets to total assets 
Firm Leverage: ratio of total debt to total assets  
Firm’s Liquidity: ratio of working capital to total assets 
Capital Expenditure/ Total Assets: ratio of capital expenditure to total assets 
 
Before we draw any ratios or analysis from these variables, we have winsorized the 
control variables at 1% level to remove the distortion effect of any outliers. All the ratios 
including current assets over total assets, liquidity, leverage, R& D over sales and capital 
expenditure over total assets have been winsorized again at 1% to further remove any 
distortions 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
Majority of previous researches on similar topic have concentrated on US markets. 
Whatever limited evidence of research in context of Canadian market we have is related 
to corporate governance and performance of firms (Adjaoud et al (2007) studied effect of 
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board’s quality using Globe and Mail (G&M) governance score on firm’s performance). 
This gives us a reason to study a topic that has been ignored by researchers previously.  
 
We conduct our research in Canadian setting to ascertain whether corporate governance 
affects the cash holdings in similar ways as it affects the US firms. Canada being 
developed country with similar size and geographical location is heavily dependent on 
the US. This fact gives us further motivation to conduct the research with a strong 
intuition that we will find results similar to those of Harford (2008). Specifically we test 
if stronger corporate governance leads to lower cash holdings or alternatively weaker 
corporate governance lead out any higher cash holdings. 
 
On one hand, we expect similar results to that of the US, whereas on the other side, 
Canada being a comparatively smaller economy and culturally different from US, we 
could expect a dissimilar relationship as well. The results in this case can be similar to the 
cross country results of Dittmar (2003). Therefore, our hypothesis in null and alternate 
form is: 
Null hypothesis (Ho): Relationship between corporate governance and cash holdings is 
positive for Canadian firms. 
Alternate hypothesis (Ha): Relationship between corporate governance and cash 
holdings is negative for Canadian firms.  
 
We differentiate our research based on the proxy used for measuring governance 
variable. Our research is handicapped by availability of only one index that measures 
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corporate governance in Canadian markets. However, the governance variable used for 
the purpose of our research is the Globe and Mail (G&M) annual corporate governance 
ratings developed by McFarland (2002), to measure the quality of corporate governance 
for Canadian firms.  
3.3 Data Analysis 
 
In this analysis we aim to quantify the relationship between corporate governance and 
cash holdings. For this we analyze the sample in two steps. In the first step, we draw a 
descriptive statistics of all the variables in the sample and perform univariate analysis. 
These statistics include mean, median, standard deviation, 25th and 75th percentiles and 
total number of observations and provide overall perspective of the sample data. We also 
compute the values of the four governance variables (shareholder rights, disclosure, 
compensation, board composition) along with their total score into percentage terms. This 
is done by dividing actual score a company received in a particular category by the 
maximum score in that category. This will give us the relative percentage value for that 
particular governance variable. Further we categorize the companies into 5 equal size 
quintiles and report the median values of cash holdings and the governance scores (in 
percent) for each quintile. First quintile represents companies that are smallest in size, 
whereas fifth quintile represents the largest companies. In addition, we dissect the 
companies into quartiles based on the “total governance” score within each size quintile.  
We then report the median values for cash holdings and governance variables for the 1st 
quartile (low governance score i.e. weak rights) and 4th quartile (high governance score 




In the second step, we examine the relationship between cash holding and governance 
variables in a multivariate setting using various control variables. To examine whether 
governance variables are related to change in firm’s cash holdings, we regress cash 
holdings on four governance variables (shareholder rights, disclosure, compensation and 
board composition).  
 
In different models, we control for several cash holding determinants and endogeneity 
using lagged cash holdings as an independent variable. In the first model we will regress 
cash holding on the total governance score. In the subsequent models, we will add 
additional independent variables i.e. control variables and lagged values of cash holdings, 
in the regression equation to compute relationship between dependent and independent 
variables which is significant at various confidence intervals. We further segregate the 
firms into five size quintiles and repeat the above mentioned regression models for the 
smallest and the largest firms to ascertain the relationship between governance and cash 




Chapter 4: ANALYSIS 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
Cash holding being the most significant variable for the purpose of our study has a mean 
value of 0.31 and median of 0.08 along with standard deviation of 1.98. This indicates 
skewness in cash holdings data that has been computed as ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents to sales. The sales and cash figures used for the purpose have been 
winsorized at 1% to mitigate the effect of any outliers. A notable observation in the above 
table is the mean and median values of the total governance score and the four 
governance variables. Total score has a mean and median value of 66.27 and 67.00 
respectively. This is followed by board composition that has a mean of 23.82, and median 
of 23.00, followed by compensation with mean of 14.51 and median of 14.00, disclosure 
with mean of 8.07 and median of 8 and shareholder rights with a mean of 19.40 and 
median of 20.00. All these values signify symmetry or proves the absence of any 
skewness in the governance data as the mean and median values are close to each other 
for all the governance variables. Firm size, calculated on the basis of log value of total 
assets, has a mean value of 7.74 and median of 7.67. 
 
Moving to the financial data, the average values of sales, capital expenditure (capex), net 
total assets(total assets minus cash and cash equivalents), research and development and 
total debt figures are winsorized at 1% and the mean and median values signify skewness 
in the data pertaining to these values. The financial ratios, which are calculated from the 
financial data, are further winsorized at 1% to arrive at final figures and the values 





The below table presents summary statistics for all the variables (including governance and 
control variables) used in our analysis. Variables are summarized based on their mean, standard 
deviation, median, 25th and 75th percentile values. Variables in table 1 include cash holdings, 
which is the ratio of cash to sales (cash and cash equivalents/ sales) followed by the four 
governance variables (board composition, compensation, disclosure and shareholder rights) with 
their absolute values. The next are control control variables including Current Assets, cash and 
short term investments, current liabilities, net total assets (total assets minus cash and cash 
equivalents), sales, capital expenditure and total figures. The aforesaid variables are expressed in 
$ millions and are winsorized at 1%. These variables are followed by size (natural log of total 
assets), ratio of research and development to sales (R&D/ Sales), ratio of current assets to total 
assets (current assets/ total assets), leverage (total debt/ total assets), liquidity (working capital/ 
total assets) and ratio of capital expenditure to total assets(capex/ total assets). All the ratio 
figures have been further winsorized at 1%to subside the effect of outliers. 
Variable Mean Median St. Dev Min Max 25th P 75th P No. of Obs. 
Cash Holdings 0.3079 0.0802 0.6545 0.0000 4.0990 0.0183 0.2749 1446 
Total Gov. Score 66.27 67.00 15.41 27.00 98.00 54.00 78.00 1615 
Board Composition 23.82 23.00 7.70 2.00 40.00 18.00 30.00 1615 
Compensation 14.51 14.00 5.37 0.00 26.00 10.00 18.00 1615 
Disclosure 8.07 8.00 3.34 0.00 15.00 5.00 11.00 1615 
Shareholder Rights 19.40 20.00 5.96 2.00 31.00 15.00 24.00 1615 
Current Assets 1133.79 530.68 1626.43 25.95 8873.00 205.02 1223.10 1427 
Cash & Cash Equivalents 330.04 106.27 618.59 0.00 3709.00 30.00 321.07 1447 
Current Liabilities 866.26 336.90 1334.73 9.51 6758.00 104.90 883.40 1427 
Assets($MM) 5526.88 2133.07 8298.64 91.06 40968.00 891.01 5261.00 1447 
Sales($MM) 3752.48 1411.41 5994.46 10.41 31820.00 386.51 4017.00 1446 
Capex 525.84 139.18 1032.77 1.91 6054.00 52.32 431.80 1446 
R&D 68.29 16.47 226.23 0.00 1856.00 1.72 52.00 383 
Total Debt 1299.78 435.53 2267.53 0.00 12187.00 96.84 1055.04 1445 
Capex/ T.Assets 0.0925 0.0670 0.0805 0.0048 0.4043 0.0327 0.1293 1446 
Liquidity 0.0193 0.0029 0.1076 -0.2882 0.3425 -0.0430 0.0772 1427 
R&D/Sales 0.1267 0.0083 0.3543 0.0000 2.5572 0.0008 0.1019 383 
C. Assets/T. Assets 0.2999 0.2658 0.1964 0.0253 0.8212 0.1379 0.4252 1427 
Leverage 0.2008 0.1968 0.1440 0.0000 0.6065 0.0894 0.2975 1445 
Size 7.7371 7.6653 1.3517 4.5115 10.6206 6.7924 8.5681 1447 
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4.2 Univariate Analysis 
 
The median and mean levels of cash holdings and the governance variables ranging 
within the 1st and the 5th quintiles are reported in table 2. Once sorted on the basis of 
quintiles, we perform the median test to examine the equality of the medians i.e. whether 
these median values (mentioned in table 2) differ across the 1st and the 5th size quintiles. 
The results of the median test suggest that there is a significant difference in the median 
values between the 1st and the 5th quintiles for cash holdings and the governance 
variables. Further our results suggest that there is a significant difference in the median 
values of cash holdings between the 1st and the 5th quintiles, with small firms (size 
quintile = 1) having higher median level cash reserves when compared with bigger firms 
(size quintile= 5), and on the other hand, small firms have low scores in all the 
governance variables, when compared with governance scores of bigger firms.  
 
We also performed the t test to check for differences in the mean values between the 1st 
and the 5th size quintile. Mean difference tests reported results similar to those of median 
test which signifies that mean and median values of cash holdings and governance 














Table 2  
In this table, we try to examine the relationship between cash holdings and governance variables 
based on the size of the firm. For this purpose, we sort the firm based on their size into quintiles 
each year. The variables used for this purpose is “size” which has been calculated by taking 
natural log of total asset value for a firm. Once firms are divided into 5 quintiles, we report the 
mean and median level of cash holdings and four governance variables (including disclosure, 
shareholder right, compensation and board composition) within these 5 quintiles. The governance 
variables here are expressed in percentage terms, calculated by dividing the actual score which 
company received in a particular category with the maximum score in that category (score 
received/ maximum score in the category).  
 
MEDIAN VALUES  








Quintile= 1(smallest) 29.85% 50.00% 54.84% 38.46% 74.19% 56.00% 
2 7.27% 58.33% 58.06% 50.00% 74.19% 64.00% 
3 4.16% 75.00% 64.52% 61.54% 74.19% 66.00% 
4 5.21% 83.33% 70.97% 61.54% 80.65% 73.00% 
Quintile= 5(largest) 5.72% 83.33% 74.19% 69.23% 77.42% 76.00% 
 
MEAN VALUES 








Quintile= 1(smallest) 85.39% 54.05% 54.67% 41.23% 74.33% 57.46% 
2 51.18% 63.32% 57.75% 51.41% 75.99% 62.70% 
3 13.69% 68.19% 60.82% 58.01% 74.40% 65.81% 
4 33.95% 73.64% 68.67% 61.84% 80.66% 71.88% 













In table 3 on page 27, we report the median values based on total governance score 
quartiles within the size quintiles. Initial look at the table suggests that, irrespective of the 
size, firms with high governance score (4th quartile G score) when compared with low 
governance score (1st quartile G score) have significantly higher disclosure, shareholder 
rights, compensation, board composition and total governance score uniformly across all 
size quintiles. The above results have been found to be statistically significant using the 
median test. We also performed the t test to check for differences in the mean values 
between the 1st and the 5th size quintile. Results presented by both the tests have been 
found to be consistent. 
 
However, for cash holdings there has been mix results. For the firms in 1st, 2nd and 5th 
size quintiles, firms with high governance score (4th quartile G score) have lower median 
level cash reserves compared to firms in with low governance score(1st quartile G score) 
within similar size quintiles. These results are somehow inconsistent with study of 
Harford et al (2008) wherein they provided evidence from United States, that firm with 
weak governance structure have lower cash reserves. However our results are consistent 
with cross country study by Dittmar et al (2003) and Lins and Kalcheva (2004) in which 
they suggested that stronger shareholder rights are linked to lower cash holdings. 
 
To further test the significance of the differences in median values based on governance 
score quartiles across various size quintiles, we perform the median test at 95% 
confidence level. The results of these tests signify that there is no statistically significant 
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difference between the cash holdings based on governance score quartiles at all levels of 
size quintiles. T test to check for differences in the mean values reveals similar results. 
Table 3  
This table is in extension to the previous table. In this table, we perform a double sort to ascertain 
the relation between governance variables and report the median values by total governance score 
quartile within the size quintiles. First we sort the firms on the basis of their size (i.e. natural log 
of total asset values for the firm) and then further sort the firms on the basis of their sum total 
score of all the four governance variables added together. Firms are sub categorized into 4 
quartiles on the basis of the total governance score within each size quintiles. Firms are classified 
as “low” if they belong to the first quartile or classified as “high” if they belong to the fourth 
quartile. The governance variables here are expressed in percentage terms, calculated by dividing 
the actual score which company received in a particular category with the maximum score in that 
category (score received/ maximum score in the category). In the first column we report the 









Size Quintile= 1     
              
High G. Score(Strong 
Rights) 24.18% 100.00% 70.97% 55.77% 112.90% 81.00% 
Low G. Score(Weak 
Rights) 34.38% 33.33% 48.39% 34.62% 54.84% 47.00% 
Size Quintile= 2     
        
      High G. Score(Strong 
Rights) 4.82% 91.67% 74.19% 73.08% 103.23% 83.00% 
Low G. Score(Weak 
Rights) 13.18% 41.67% 45.16% 34.62% 58.06% 47.00% 
Size Quintile= 3     
        
      High G. Score(Strong 
Rights) 7.32% 91.67% 80.65% 73.08% 103.23% 83.00% 
Low G. Score(Weak 
Rights) 3.26% 41.67% 48.39% 42.31% 51.61% 49.00% 
Size Quintile= 4     
        
      High G. Score(Strong 
Rights) 9.40% 91.67% 83.87% 80.77% 93.55% 87.00% 
Low G. Score(Weak 
Rights) 8.98% 41.67% 51.61% 38.46% 51.61% 47.00% 
Size Quintile= 5     
        
      High G. Score (Strong 
Rights) 5.90% 91.67% 83.87% 78.85% 96.77% 87.00% 
Low G. Score (Weak 
Rights) 7.68% 41.67% 35.48% 53.85% 54.84% 50.00% 
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4.3 Multivariate Analysis 
 
Assuming a linear relationship exists between cash holdings and governance variable; in 
table 4 (page 30), we examine the relationship between cash holdings and governance and 
various control variables. For this purpose, cash holdings, the variable of interest, is the 
dependent variable that is natural log of cash to sales and governance variables along with 
various control variables serves as the independent variables. The coefficient of the 
governance variables directly addresses the predictions of our hypothesis.  
 
In model 1, we assume cash holdings is a function of total governance score i.e.  
cash holdings = f(total governance score). We regress cash holdings on only one 
independent variable, which is the total governance score. A total governance score is the 
sum total of all the governance variables and adds up to 100. A high governance score 
suggests stronger governance in a firm. The results in model 1 suggest a negative 
relationship between corporate governance and cash holdings. T value of (-3.50) further 
suggests that this inverse relationship is significant at 99% confidence interval. These 
initial results are inconsistent with evidence from the US market. 
 
In model 2, we dissect the governance variable by adding the individual governance 
variables in the regression equation instead of the total governance score. Now we assume 
cash holding is a function of i.e. Cash holdings = f (shareholder rights, compensation, 
board composition, disclosure). We found that the dependent variable, cash holdings, has 
negative relationship with board composition and compensation, significant at 99% 
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confidence level. The other two governance variables, shareholder rights and disclosure do 
not have a significant relationship with cash holdings. This signifies that the negative sign 
in the total governance score perhaps comes from board composition and compensation. 
 
Moving to model 3, we add size and non-governance control variables to our equation. The 
results are as expected i.e. firms with lower cash holdings tend to have higher leverage, 
liquidity and these firms make more investments through capital expenditures. On the 
other hand, firms with higher cash holdings are characterized by higher growth options, as 
they tend to spend more on current assets and research and development. The size variable 
suggests a positive relationship with cash holdings, suggesting bigger firms having more 
cash reserves. However with the addition of control variables, total governance score does 
not hold any significant relationship with cash holdings but the direction of the relationship 
does not change. 
 
Model 4 is an extension to model 3, we use an alternative approach and try to examine 
whether the total governance score and control variables are related to the changes in cash 
holdings of a firm. This will provide us with evidence as to the ability of firm’s governance 
to predict the future cash holdings of the firm, by controlling for the lagged value of the 
cash holdings. For this we add the lagged value of the cash holdings to our existing 
regression model. Adding the lagged value of cash holdings in the equation takes care of 
the endogeneity and the results suggest a significant negative relationship between cash 
holdings and total governance score (i.e. 10% significance level). The results for the 





In column 1 we regress cash holdings on the total governance score and control variables. The 
dependent variable cash holding is calculated by taking natural log of cash/ sales ratio. The 
independent variables in this case are the four governance variables (i.e. board composition, 
shareholder rights, compensation and disclosure) and their sum total score. The other independent 
variables include the lagged value of cash holdings and firm specific control variables: size which 
is natural log of total assets, ratio of capital expenditure to total assets (capex/ total assets), ratio 
of current assets to total assets, ratio of working capital to total assets as a measure of firm’s 
liquidity, ratio of total debt to total assets as measure of firm’s leverage. Models 1 through 3 
apply the same sample using different independent variables. Z Statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. 
Dependent Variable: 
Cash holdings Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Total Score -0.0116***  -0.0017 -0.0072**   (-3.50)   (-0.43) (-1.65) 
Board Composition  -0.5185***       (-3.19)    
Compensation  -0.7960***       (-3.78)    
Shareholder Rights  0.1020       (0.39)    
Disclosure  -0.0267       (-0.21)    
Size     0.2020*** 0.2920*** 
      (2.39) (3.69) 
Leverage   -1.1733*** -0.8098**       (-2.42) (-1.66) 
R&D/Sales   1.2134*** .9156***       (6.66) (4.77) 
Liquidity   -2.5097*** -1.6495***       (-4.55) (-2.63) 
CapEx/Total Assets   -5.9200*** -1.3037       (-4.97) (-1.01) 
Sales   -0.00004*** -0.0001***       (-2.75) (-3.91) 
C.Assets/ Total Assets   3.5701*** 41.9722***       (10.00) (4.88) 
Cash Holdings(t-1)    0.5562***        (12.56) 






Finally, we examine the effect of size of the firm on the relationship between cash holdings 
and governance variables and the control variables. For this we divide the firm into 5 size 
quintiles. Below we report the results for 1st size quintile (smallest size firms) and the firms 
in the 5th quintile (biggest size firms) 
Table 5 
In column 1 we regress cash holdings on the total governance score and control variables. The 
dependent variable cash holding is calculated by taking natural log of cash/ sales ratio. The 
independent variables in this case are the four governance variables (i.e. board composition, 
shareholder rights, compensation and disclosure) and their sum total score. The other independent 
variables include the lagged value of cash holdings and firm specific control variables: size which 
is natural log of total assets, ratio of capital expenditure to total assets (capex/ total assets), ratio of 
current assets to total assets, ratio of working capital to total assets as a measure of firm’s liquidity, 
ratio of total debt to total assets as measure of firm’s leverage. Second column represents results for 
firms in the 1st size quintile (small size firms), whereas column 2 represents results for firms from 
the 5th size quintile (biggest size firms). Models 1 through 3 apply the same sample using different 
independent variables. Z Statistics are reported in parenthesis 
 
 
   SIZE QUINTILE 1  (NO. of obs. 272)        SIZE QUINTILE 5  (NO. of obs. 273) 
Dependent Variable: 
Cash holdings Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Total Score -0.0114** -0.0113*** -0.0167*** -.0052 -.0051 -.0069 
  (-1.66) (-2.17) (-2.84) (-0.67) (-0.32) (-0.32) 
Size  0.6078*** 1.0917***  1.4306*** 1.0204** 
    (4.02) (5.23)   (3.25) (1.95) 
Leverage  -1.9231*** -2.5076***  -0.6688 -1.0202 
    (-2.50) (-2.53)   (-0.48) (-0.67) 
R&D/Sales  0.9966*** .8909***  -6.2811 -4.5346 
    (7.14) (5.83)   (-0.90) (-0.72) 
Liquidity  -2.0053*** -0.7500  -2.9758 -2.2155 
    (-3.38) (-0.94)   (-0.84) (-0.51) 
CapEx/Total Assets  -7.3854*** 0.0597  -2.9967 -6.5401** 
    (-6.09) (0.03)   (-0.98) (-1.76) 
Sales  -0.0030*** -0.0028***  -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
    (-5.90) (-5.65)   (-3.91) (-3.05) 
C.Assets/ Total Assets  2.2659*** 3.0216***  8.0159*** 5.5288*** 
    (5.63) (5.46)   (4.46) (2.45) 
Cash Holdings(t-1)   0.2895***   .0917 
      (3.88)     (0.59) 
Constant -.5766 -3.9172 -6.9847 -2.3599 -16.0658 -11.1743 
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In previous table, we segregate the regression analysis on the basis of the size of the 
firms. For this purpose we divided the firms into 5 size quintiles and reported the results 
for the firms in the 1st and the 5th size quintiles. It is quite evident from the results that, 
small size firms show a very significant inverse relationship with between cash holdings 
and governance. In spite of adding the control variables, total governance score has a 
significant relationship with cash holdings. The non-governance control variables have 
expected signs and have shown results consistent with the overall results. Small size 
firms with low cash holdings tend to have higher capital expenditure and have higher 
debt, which is indicated by higher leverage. On the other hand, small size firms with high 
cash holdings spent more on research and development and current assets rather than 
long-term measures like capital expenditures. 
 
 For larger firms (size quintile 5), even though governance has a negative relationship 
with cash holdings, but the results are not very significant. Even the control variables in 
these firms have shown relationship, which has been consistent with the overall results, 
but this relationship is not significant so as to draw any conclusion from it.  
 
We can conclude from the above results that negative relationship between cash holdings 
and governance can be attributed to the small size firms in Canada. These firms have 
shown more consistent results with different measures. The overall regression results for 
the Canadian market, mentioned in table 4 on page 30 are in sync with the results for 
small size firms. On the other side, big size firms have shown results, which are 
inconsistent with the overall results, and hence we cannot draw any conclusion for them. 
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Chapter 5: CONCLUSION 
We initiate this by establishing that Canadian firms with stronger governance tend to hold 
lower cash reserves. The overall payout results suggest that, firms choosing to spend 
some of their cash tend to differ in methods of spending, which depends on the 
governance structure of the firm. Firms with strong governance and low cash holdings 
tend to have higher capital expenditures, whereas entrenched managers with high cash 
reserves spend more on research and development and current assets. Further insight into 
the Canadian market reveals that, small size firms have shown stronger consistency with 
these overall results whereas bigger firms have shown results, which are inconsistent with 
the overall market. This is consistent with the assumption that investors in companies 
with poor shareholder protection cannot force managers to disgorge excessive cash 
balances. 
 
This was a country specific study, which provides an overall view of how governance in 
Canadian firm affects its cash holdings. Despite its geographical proximity to the United 
States, the results in Canadian market have been contrasting to that of the Harford (2008) 
in context of the United States, and are more in sync with the overall global results as 
sighted by Dittmar (2003). 
 
This research presents a platform for future research in similar context that will further 
confirm the interpretation of our results. There is a further scope to study the impact of 
governance on profitability and valuation of Canadian firms i.e. how do governance 
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Components of Globe and Mail Corporate Governance Score 
Board composition, which is the first component, has a weightage of 31 points out of 
100. Points are granted for percentage of directors who are fully independent Additional 
points are awarded for independence of audit committee, compensation committee 
(committee that determines the pay to executives) and nominating committee 
(responsible for recommending new directors). The presence of a formal system to assess 
the performance of directors and the board along with various other factors are taken into 
consideration.   
Second component deals with issues related to shareholding and compensation, which 
comprises of 26 points. Apart from permission to own stock by directors this includes 
number of shares owned by directors, efficiency of company to disclose compensation 
policies and total value of CEOs accumulated shares and disclosure of performance 
appraisal plan of the company. 
Third component, which is shareholder rights, has a weightage of 31 points out of the 
total score of 100.   This component evaluates the company on issues like whether the 
company allows the shareholders to vote for individual directors. McFarland (2002) 
mentions that marks are awarded if there is no distinction between voting and equity 
rights of shareholders. Furthermore, this component looks into issues like excessive 
dilutive nature of employee stock options and grant rate of stock options.  
The fourth component deals with disclosure issues and this is worth 12 points out of 100.  
Marks are awarded if company provides a detailed explanation of relationship between 
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directors, attendance of directors at meetings, age of directors, a mention of skill matrix 
in proxy circular, which specifies the area of expertise of each director. Overall this 
component deals with the quality of disclosed information as per the requirements 
specified by OSC (Ontario Securities Commission). Full marks are awarded if the 
company fully incorporates all the disclosure requirements of OSC. 
 
